Empire and Social-Reform, British Liberals and the Civilizing Mission in the Sugar Colonies, 1868-1874 by Smith, James Patterson
The University of Southern Mississippi
The Aquila Digital Community
Faculty Publications
6-1-1995
Empire and Social-Reform, British Liberals and the
Civilizing Mission in the Sugar Colonies,
1868-1874
James Patterson Smith
University of Southern Mississippi, JamesPat.Smith@usm.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://aquila.usm.edu/fac_pubs
Part of the History Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Aquila Digital Community. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by
an authorized administrator of The Aquila Digital Community. For more information, please contact Joshua.Cromwell@usm.edu.
Recommended Citation
Smith, J. P. (1995). Empire and Social-Reform, British Liberals and the Civilizing Mission in the Sugar Colonies, 1868-1874. Albion,
27(2), 253-277.
Available at: http://aquila.usm.edu/fac_pubs/5980
 Empire and Social Reform:, British Liberals and the
 "Civilizing Mission" in the Sugar Colonies, 1868-1874
 James Patterson Smlith
 In contrast to the spirit of laissez-faire, the Colonial Office under Gladstone's
 first government served as a large-scale social engineering agency concerned
 with the cautious restructuring of volatile societies in the sugar-producing
 colonies of the West Indies and the Indian Ocean. From the perspective of the
 Colonial Office civilizing the barbarian made him more governable. There is
 a revealing paradox in the fact that so muclh of what Victorian Liberals did in
 the name of civilizing benighted natives involved active government initiatives
 in imperial settings. Under the banner of "peace, retrenchment, and refonn"
 nineteenth-century British Liberals advocated cost-cutting and laissez-faire at
 home and non-expansion abroad. Liberal leaders' public statements in this vein
 helped set the historiographical stereotype of supposed Gladstonian Liberal "lit-
 tle Englandism" versus a dramatic imperial policy shift toward "forward move-
 ment" in the Disraelian Conservative era. Scholarship over the last thirty years
 has refuted this older view and has stressed the continuity of British imperialism
 throughout the nineteenth century.' However, a careful examination of the
 details of policy reveals that from 1868-74 the Liberals not only valued the
 Empire, but were willing to sacrifice their own theories of limited government
 iThe works of R. L. Schuyler, C. A. Bodelsen, and A. P. Newton created the pre-World War II
 orthodox view that set the "little England" stereotype of Liberal imperial policy. See R. L. Schuyler,
 The Fall of the Old Colonial System: A Study in British Free Trade, 1770-1870 (New York, 1945),
 pp. 245-76; R. L. Schuyler, "The Climax of Anti-Imperialism in England," Political Science
 Quarterly 36 (1921): 537-60; C. A. Bodelsen, Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialismii (Londoni, 1924),
 pp. 8 and 88-91; and A. P. Newton, "Internationial Colonial Rivalry: The New World, 1815-1870,"
 in The Cambridge History of the British Empire, ed. J. H. Rose, A. P. Newton, and E. A. Benians,
 Vol. 2: The Growth of the New Enipire 1783-1870 (Cambridge, 1940), pp. 525-47. The works of
 Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher first challenged the orthodox view in the 1950s and early
 1960s. For the development of this debate see John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, "The Im-
 perialism of Free Trade," Economic History Review, 2nd Ser., 6 (1953): 1-15; Ronald Robinson
 and Johln Gallagher with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imnperialisnm
 (London, 1961); Other works contributinig to the revisioniist view include B. A. Knox, "Reconisidering
 Mid-Victoriani Imperialism," The Journal of Imperial and Commnmontwealth History 1 (1973): 155-72;
 C. C. Eldridge, England's Mission: The Imperial Idea in the Age of Gladstone and Disraeli, 1868-
 1880 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1973); idem, Victorian Imperialism (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1978); Susan
 Farnsworth, The Evolution of British Imtperial Policy During the Mid-Nineteenth Century: A Study
 of the Peelite Conitribution, 1846-74 (New York, 1992); and James Patterson Smith, "Retrenchmenit,
 Reform, and Empire: Lord Kimberley and the Liberal Imperial Dilemma, 1868-74," (Ph.D. diss.,
 Vanderbilt University, 1984), in revision for publication. The expainsionist impulse in Liberal
 colonial policy is stressed in W. D. McIntyre, The Imperial Frontier in the Tropics, 1865-75 (Lon-
 don, 1967).
 Albion 27, 2 (Summer 1995): 253-277. C) North American Conference on British Studies 1995. All Rights Reserved.
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 in order to strengthen the British hold-even on their bankrupt sugar colonies
 in the Caribbean and Indian oceans. Initiatives in colonial religion, education,
 health, justice, and labor regulation demonstrate a surprising Liberal bent toward
 government activism in the non-white Empire. Moreover, the self-conscious and
 energetic manipulation of such a wide range of policy tools reveals a serious
 Liberal commitment to empire, which further belies the old notion that from
 1868-74, "little Englandism" reached its high point.
 Victorian Liberals were of two minds about government activism. On the one
 hand they preached laissez-faire. On the other hand upper class fear of the
 laboring masses packed into urban industrial squalor prompted much speculation
 about the bases of order and social peace at home. Tools of repression ranging
 from professional police forces to prisons and the court system were seen as
 means to persuade England's poor to inhibit their destruLctive proclivities. How-
 ever, many Victorians believed that social stability needed extensive rooting
 beyond simple pain infliction, which taught only negative lessons whose effects
 were easily lost when the threat of suffering was removed.2 To instill a positive
 view of civilized conduct required a host of other institutions. Where lower-class
 family life had failed to civilize, church, school, and employers were to fill the
 void. Where private efforts proved insufficient, state departures from laissez-
 faire orthodoxy were justified. Education, religion, family life, disciplined work,
 and wholesome leisure activities might all be used to tame the brutish multitudes
 and save society.3 That Victorians often speculated about such potential bulttres-
 ses for social peace in no way establishes that they were actually effective. Such
 thinking was, however, a part of the intellectual environment out of which
 colonial policy emerged.
 As an ideal, much of the underpinning of social stability was to be entrusted
 to the natural influence of "men of authority, property, and rank" performing
 their individual and local duties to those dependent on them. In the eyes of
 Victorian paternalists, men of property with permanent interests in the land,
 plus personal knowledge of their own dependents, would ensure appropriate
 management of the deserving poor through justice and mercy and of the un-
 deserving through firmness. Furthermore, they believed that intimate contact
 between the poor and the powerfuil reinforced a tendency for the dependent and
 2Robert D. Storch, "The Problem of Working-Class Leisure: Some Roots of Middle Class Reform
 in the Inidustrial North 1825-1850," in Social Control in Nineteenth Century Britain, ed. A. P.
 Donajgrodzki (Lonidon, 1977), pp. 138-42; A. P. Donajgrodzki, "'Social Police' and the Bureaucratic
 Elite: A Visioin of Order in the Age of Reform," in ibid., pp. 51-59; and David Roberts, Paternalism
 in Early Victorian? Eniglanid (New Brunswick, N.J., 1979), pp. 6-10.
 3Richard Johnson, "Educational Policy and Social Control in Early Victoriani Englanid, 1833-39"
 Past & Present 49 (November 1970): 96; and Richard Johnsoni, "Educating the Educators: 'Experts'
 and the State 1822-29," in Social Conitrol, ed. Donajgrodzki, pp. 77-80 and 94-95.
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 weak to identify with and absorb the values of their powerful benefactors, there-
 by promoting good order.4 This personal "influence" was cheaper and more
 effective than raw coercion. In matters touching social peace, local grandees
 were best left to themselves to devise workable solutions.5
 However well or ill it may have worked in England, London's non-interfering
 trust in local paternalism proved disastrous for her racially tense plantatibn
 societies in the West Indies and Mauritius. Before Jamaica's 1865 Morant Bay
 Rebellion, Britain followed a hands-off policy with regard to the internal -affairs
 of these sugar-producing colonies. Prior to 1865 two forns of local government
 were to be found in Britain's sugar colonies. Colonies such as Trinidad, British
 Guiana, and Mauritius, which were acquired during the French Revolutionary
 Wars, were given Crown Colony status with autocratic governors ruling through
 Crown-appointed councils. Older traditional British colonies such as Jamaica
 and Barbados were governed similarly to the North American Colonies before
 1776 with two-house legislatures-one house Crown-appointed, the other
 elected by the colonists. With ninety to ninety-five percent non-white popula-
 tions, property-not race-qualified their tiny electorates. However, over time
 these narrowly elected legislative bodies had degenerated into corrupt, oppres-
 sive, planter-controlled oligarchies. The collapse of world sugar prices, the 1830s
 emancipation of the slaves, and the adoption of free trade in the 1840s destroyed
 the economic value of the British West Indies and Mauritius and created massive
 social problems that, in. good laissez-faire form, the corrupt local assemblies
 had refused to address.
 The bloody Morant Bay Rebellion was one resuilt of that refuisal. With un-
 dertones of race war, the revolt called British control of the West Indies into
 quiestion and heightened sensitivities to the potential for social turbulence in all
 of the stugar colonies. Over the next decade the Russell and Gladstone Liberal
 ministries moved to eliminate the elective elements in older West Indian govern-
 ments in favor of new; authoritarian Crown Colony governments with effective
 power vested in the hands of Crown-appointed governors and councils.6 Where
 4David C. Moore, The Politics of Deference: A Study of the Mid-Nineteenth Century English Political
 System (New York, 1976), pp. 9-12, 234, 295-96, and 407-08; Roberts, Paternalism, pp. 1-10.
 5Johni Vincenit, The Formation of the Liberal Party 1857-68 (Londoln, 1966), pp. 211-14.
 6For Victorian reflections oni the problem of West Indian government see Arthur Mills, "Our Colonial
 Policy," Contem1porary Review 11 (June 1869), and W. J. Gardner, A History of Jamaica From Its
 Discovery by Christopher Columbus to the Year 1872 (Londoni, 1873; repr., 1971). Secondary treat-
 ments of the governmenit problem may be founid in Franklin W. Knight, The Caribbean: The Gen-
 nesis of a Fragmented Nationalismii (Second ed.; New York, 1990), pp. 159-92; Morley Ayearst,
 The British West Indies: The Search for Self Government (Londoin, 1960), p. 17; Bruce Hamilton,
 Barbados and the Confederationi Question, 1871-1885 (Londoni, 1956), p. 12; Samuel and Edith
 Hurwitz, Jamaica; A Historical Portrait (New York, 1971), p. 177; Hume Wrong, Government of
 the West Indies (Oxford, 1923), p. 78; J. H. Parry and P. M. Sherlock, A Short History of the West
 Indies (New York, 1966), p. 215; C. S. S. Higham, "Sir Henry Taylor and the Establishmeent of
This content downloaded from 131.95.218.41 on Wed, 14 Jun 2017 15:04:41 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 256 Jamees Pattersont Smlith
 the Crown Colony form already existed, as in Mauritius, governors now sought
 ways to increase their influence and control over the existing Crown-appointed
 councils that over time had found ways to obstruct official policy.7
 Given the material ruin of these troubled colonies and the sacrifice of political
 and economic principles involved in holding them, the question of why they
 were retained at all naturally suggests itself. Like their seventeenth- and
 eighteenth-century predecessors, Liberal policy-makers of the 1870s held a high
 opinion of the strategic value of their sugar colonies in the Caribbean. Blocking
 American expansion was now the concern rather than checkmating France or
 Spain. In the Gladstone era, possession of the West Indies provided Britain
 naval bases from which her interests in any future isthmian canal could be
 protected. As Lord Kimberley, the Colonial Secretary, explained to Gladstone,
 "someday when a canal is made from the Atlantic to the Pacific, the W. India
 Islands will greatly rise in importance. 8 Post-Civil War U.S. efforts to acquire
 Santo Domingo and the Danish Virgin Islands, and American meddling in the
 Cuban insurrection provoked renewed British concern for the defence of her
 own possessions and set the stage for Britain's 1869 efforts to secure French
 support in matters relating to the future isthmian canal.9 General Ainslie, the
 British military commander in the area, believed it "more than probable that
 sooner or later the Americans would be found to be both disagreeable and
 troublesome neighbors. "'0 A number of memoranda on the defense of the British
 West Indies against U.S. attack passed between the Colonial Office and War
 Office throughout 1868 and 1869. Defensive strategy came to focus on project-
 Crown Coloniy Governmnent in the West Inidies," Scottish Historical Review 23 (January 1926): 94;
 and Eric A. Williams, A History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago (London, 1962), p. 132.
 7Gordon to Kimberley, 30 May 1871, The Gladstone-Gordon Correspondence, 1851-1896: Selec-
 tions From the Private Correspondence of a British Prime Minister and a Colonial Governzor, ed.
 Paul Knaplund, Transactions of tme American Philosophical Society, new ser., 51 (1961): 58; Gordon
 to Kimberley, 1 June 1871, Colonial Office Files (C.O.), Confideintial Correspondenice Relating to
 Indian Immigrants in Mauritius, C.O. 882/2, Public Record Office, Kew, Richmond, Surrey; and
 J. K. Chapman, The Career of Arthuir Hamilton Gordon: First Lord Stanmore 1829-1912 (Toronto,
 1964),pp. 103-05.
 8Kimberley to Gladstone, 23 August 1871, Gladstone Papers, British Library, Lonidon, Add. Mss.
 44224/139.
 9W.F. Reddaway, "IInternationlal Colonial Rivalry; Great Britain and France, 1848-1870," The
 Cambridge History of the British Empire, ed. E. A. Benians, et al., Vol. 2: The Growth of the New
 Emnpire 1783-1870 (Cambridge, 1940), p. 563; Richard Van Alstyne, "Britain in Latin America
 After 1865," Current History 28 (March 1955): 149; Christopher Bartlet, "British Reaction to the
 Cuban Insurrection of 1868-1878," Hispanic American Historical Review 37 (August 1957): 296-98;
 and Charles C. Jacobs, "Jamaica and the Cuban Ten Years War, 1868-1878," Jamaica Journal 44
 (June 1980): 80-92.
 '0Ainslie to the Military Secretary, 18 December 1867, Colonial Office Files, West Indies, Public
 Record Office, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, C.O. 318/254.
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 ing naval power from Bermuda. Thus, Gladstone's government presided over a
 massive upgrading of the naval and military facilities at Bermuda."
 Similarly, strategic thinking prompted the Liberals to reject Governor Arthur
 Hamilton Gordon's proposal to cede Mauiritius in the Indian Ocean to France.
 Gordon argued that the opening of the Suez Canal had rendered Mauritius utterly
 valueless. Moreover, a British pull-out would save the Imperial Exchequer
 ?30,000 per year. London saw things quite differently. The new age of steam
 navigation was dawning with its attendant needs for strategic coaling stations.
 There was a risk that Suez could fall into hostile foreign hands. Thus, Mauritius,
 along the alternate Cape route to India and China, seemed to London to be "of
 equal importance now to that which rendered it of so much interest in former
 times."12 While many Liberal reformers, humanitarians, and mission societies
 still carried the abolitionist crusaders' sense of moral obligation to nurture these
 ex-slave societies toward progress, Thomas Holt, Douglas Lorimer, and Chris-
 tine Bolt'3 have shown that public support for such idealism had eroded seriously
 by the late 1860s. It is no surprise then that Liberal British officialdom most
 often couched discussions about retaining the sugar colonies in the pragmatic
 language of strategic power. In large measure, it was eighteenth-century con-
 ceptions of world power inmperatives that continued to provide the ultimate of-
 ficial rationale for holding these poor outposts in the 1870s.
 However, Morant Bay, plus a series of smaller indentured coolie labor riots
 in British Guiiana, and threats of such disturbances in Mauritius, made it clear
 that there was a direct relation between the social health of the sugar colonies
 and Britain's ability safely and cheaply to retain them. Enlightened policies
 promoting justice, order, and security were essential to attracting the new in-
 vestments, that might prevent further economic deterioration. Where the local
 planter-elites had failed to produce stability, London would have to act. In order
 11Minute by Rogers on War Office to Colonial Office, 23 January 1868, C.O. 318/254; War Office
 Comfidential Memorandum, "Considerationis oni the Military Position of Great Britain with Respect
 to the United States, 28 May 1869," Gladstone Papers, Add. Mss. 44610, f. 53; Report of Colonel
 Drummond Jervois, 19 May 1869, Granville Papers, P.R.O. 30/29/53; Memorandum by Hugh
 Childers, 14 May 1869, Gladstone Papers (Cabinet Memorandums), Add. Mss. 44637, f. 59; and
 Henry C. Wilkinsoni, Bermuda Fron Sail to Steam: The History of the Islandfrom 1784 to 1901,
 2 vols., (Londoni, 1973), 2: 743-55.
 12Barkly to Granville, 10 April 1869, C.O. 882/2; Storks to Sanford, 12 June 1869, C.O. 882/2;
 Kimberley Diary, 29 May 1870, Kimberley Papers, A-3, Oxford, The Bodleian Library; Gordon
 to Gladstone, 3 May and 2 June 1871, The Gladstone-Gordon Correspondence, ed. Knaplunid, 51:
 57; Gordon to Kimberley, 2 Julle 1871, and Kimberley to Gordon, 9 June 1871, Kimberley Papers
 G-130; and Kimberley to Gladstonie, 6 June 1871, Gladstone Papers, Add. Mss. 44224/139.
 13Thomas C. Holt, The Problem of Freedonm: Race, Labor, and Politics in Jamaica and Britain,
 1832-1938 (Baltimore, 1992), pp. xxii-xxiii, and 307-08; Douglas A. Lorimer, Colour, Class and
 the Victorians: English Attitudes to the Negro in the Mid-Nineteenth Century (New York, 1978),
 pp. 119-23; and Christine Bolt, Victorian Attitudes to Race (London, 1971), pp. 77-105.
This content downloaded from 131.95.218.41 on Wed, 14 Jun 2017 15:04:41 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 258 Jamnes Patterson Smnith
 to perpetuate British control, central government would now command action
 in colonial settings that strict liberal ideology would flinch from doing at home.
 Ideology notwithstanding, well conceived reform would shore up British control
 in strategic areas. Moreover, because reform would also serve the interests of
 the masses of colonial subjects, humanitarian groups at home would welcome
 it.
 Local initiative had failed in the sugar colonies. Neither white planters nor
 their black labor force fit the paternalistic mold cast for them in Britain. Rather
 than producing a united, self-assured elite that sensed its own permanent interest
 in justice for the lower orders, absentee landlordism in the West Indies left
 social leadership to a white managerial class more attuned to quick profits and
 status seeking than to long-lasting social peace. Governor Sir Henry Gregory
 of Ceylon, who presided over a colony with a tea and coffee-planter class similar
 in motivation to the West Indian and Mauritian sugar planters, described suc-
 cinctly the deficiencies generally complained of in colonial planters. Gregory
 found that even the resident European landlord in Ceylon did not work the land
 "with the view of permanent occupation or of handing his plantation down to
 his children," as was typical in Europe. Rather, colonial planters worked the
 land "to make the most of it, sell it while its reputation remains, and be off'
 before soil exhaustion made estates worthless.'4 Moreover, Mannoni and
 Thornton argue that pathological and socially destructive status seeking fur-
 nished the more powerful motive for many members of the white leadership
 clique who, as failed exiles from competitive European society, sought social
 dominance over the black under-classes as a psychological compensation.'
 However difficult it may be to throw objective historical light on settler psychol-
 ogy, it is a fact that by the 1870s Gladstone's cabinet saw real danger in in-
 vesting self-interested white settler minorities with power over black majorities
 anywhere in the Empire.'6 To add confusion, in Mauritius and Trinidad bitter
 French versus English ethnic and religious conflicts divided the upper class
 white minority against itself.
 If the master class could not play its proper paternalistic role, neither could
 the Afro-West Indian laborer. Bitter memories of slavery and the struggle for
 14Gregory to Kimberley (Private) 21 March 1872, Kimberley Papers, G-132.
 15O. Mannonii, Prospero and Caliban: Thte Psychology of Colonization, trans. Pamela Powesland
 (New York, 1956), pp. 11, 32, 102-04, 120-26, and 203-04; and A. P. Thornton, Doctrines of
 Imperialismn (New York, 1965), pp. 191-94.
 16Wodehouse to Granville, 17 June 1870, C.O. 879/2/7; Parliamentary Debates (Lords), 3rd ser.,
 vol. 209 (8 March 1872): 1622-33; "Autobiographical Notes," in The Letters of Frederick Lord
 Blachford, ed. George E. Marindini (London, 1896), p. 298; Kimberley to Barkly, 21 July 1871,
 C.O. 879/2/101; Kimberley to Barkly, 6 October 1872, Kimberley Papers, G-110; Kimberley to
 Barkly, 17 October 1870, Parliamentary Papers, 1871, vol. 47 [C.459], p. 450; Barkly to Kimberley,
 31 May 1871, C.O. 879/2/85; and Frederick Lord Blachford, "South African Policy," The Nineteenth
 Century 6 (August 1879): 269.
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 emancipation made black men less susceptible to the influence of the white
 upper classes than the Euiropean peasants. Moreover, religious differences further
 alienated master and servant in the West Indies. The zeal of Baptist and
 Methodist missionaries in making converts and opposing slavery endeared them
 to colonial blacks, while it drew the ill-will of the planters and resulted in bitter
 religious differences between the white Anglican elites and the largely non-con-
 formist black working class.'7 In the post emancipation era the addition of large
 numbers of immigrant Indian coolie indentured laborers further complicated
 master-laborer relationships in the West Indies and Mauritius.
 Despite the fact that government-sponsored social activism in the colonies
 contradicted the received liberal dogma of laissez-faire, it produced little if any
 controversy in Gladstone's cabinet. Gladstone himself justified the departlure as
 necessary to "secure the elevating and civilizing aims of emancipation."'8 The
 Econ10omist, a joirnal of moderate Liberal thinking, fouind "the one necessity
 essential to the development" of profitable trade with the non-white Empire was
 some system tinder which "very large bodies of dark labourers" cotuld be induced
 to "work willingly under a few European supervisors." "In the absence of
 slavery," the editorialist argued, "the only possible relation" between whites and
 blacks must be based upon a "policy of justice to the darker races." Injustice
 had provoked the bloody clash in Jamaica and threatened to give Britain a
 negative reputation that wouild make it difficult to get cooperative black labor
 elsewhere. "Justice to the darker races" would prove more effective than repres-
 sion in maintaining the Empire and promoting trade.'9 Economic as well as
 social considerations thus demanded government action. In fact, reluctant gover-
 nors found themselves prodded. "Government does, and it ought to do in India,
 much which in Europe is uindertaken by Private Enterprise, or by mtunicipal and
 other local bodies," the Duke of Argyll, Gladstone's Secretary of State for India,
 wrote Governor General Lord Mayo in 1870. In India, Argyll continued, "it
 may be said with substantial truth that private enterprise does not exist,..." and
 the local machinery of government "is yet but imperfectly developed."20 India
 firnished the instructive model for much that was done in the non-white Empire.
 From London's perspective, in the sugar colonies, just as in India, local institu-
 tions-local leadership-had failed. Where "a deficiency of material" created
 17Grant to Granville, 23 July 1869, Parlianmentary Papers, 1871, vol. 48 (269), pp. 568-69; Cham-
 bers to Kimberley, 12 October 1872, Parliamentary Papers, 1873, vol 48 (259), pp. 781-84; and
 "Memorial of the Jamaica Baptist Unioni oni the Clergy Law," 1868 in C.O. 137/440.
 18William Ewart Gladstone, "Englanid's Mission," The Nineteenth Centuiry 4 (September 1878):
 581-82.
 19"'Economic Value of Justice to the Darker Races," The Economist 23 (December 1865): 1487-89.
 20Argyll to the Govemor General (India), 12 May 1870, India Office Records, Despatches to India,
 India Office Library, Londoni, I.O.R. NEG. 4237.
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 a void in local initiative, according to liberal publicist Arthur Mills, central
 government had no choice but to act.2' Therefore, without any real debate, lais-
 sez-faire gave way to centrally-directed government activism. Thus in the sugar
 colonies social reforms often involving new social spending schemes took
 precedence over ideological correctness.
 Like other Victorians, the Liberal politicians of the 1870s believed religion
 was a vital element in promoting social peace both at home and in colonial
 settings.22 In the non-white Empire officials saw church attendance as inocula-
 tion against sedition-as godliness increased, the dangers of poptular outbreaks
 would decrease. Declining black church attendance was in-part blamed for the
 1865 Jamaica Rebellion. Relapse into heathenism and barbarism threatened
 blacks apart from the civilizing influence of the church.23 However, in the
 colonies religion was not aimed at the black poor alone. Governor Rawson of
 Barbados believed that "the moral and religious cultuire of the upper classes,
 and of the white race" was as much "needed for the welfare and happiness of
 these communities..." as that of the subject races. Rawson considered the spread
 of religion in the elites to be "almost as effectual towards the moral and religious
 culture of the coloured labourers as the direct teaching of those classes." To
 Rawson nothing would "tend to fuse the two classes...as a high degree of
 religious culture in the upper classes."24 This same linkage of Christianity to
 civil order, security, and progress had led Parliament in 1824 to create a special
 imperial fund to expand the work of the Church of England among the slaves
 of the West Indies in preparation for emancipation. By 1868 appropriations from
 the British Consolidated fund for religious work in the West Indies amouinted
 to ?20,300 annually.. The various colonies themselves appropriated another
 ?60,000 per year to this cause from local revenuies.25
 Despite almost half a century of imperial aid, by 1868 the established church
 in the West Indies was in a minority position much the same as the Irish Chuirch.
 The poor, mainly black, non-conformist majority bitterly resented the West In-
 dian Anglican Church as the tax-supported church of the white colonial elite.
 Angry agitations against the favored status of the established church had
 preceded the Morant Bay tuprising. This hostility underscored the potential
 21Arthur Mills, "Our Coloniial Policy," Contemiiporary Review 11 (June 1869): 226-29.
 22Frederick D. Schneider, "The Anglican Church in the British Empire," (Nashville, unpublished
 manuscript), p. 678; and Jenifer Hart, "Religioni and Social Control in the Mid-Nineteenith Century,"
 in Social Control, ed. Doniajgrodzki (Lonidon, 1977), pp. 112-22.
 23Minute by Elliot oni Grant to Granville, 23 July 1869, C.O. 137/442; Morris to Myers, 1 January
 1866, Douet to Myers, I JanuLary 1866, and Findlay to Myers, 16 January 1866, Parliaomenttary
 Papers, 1866, vol. 30 [C. 3682], pp. 40, 86, 89.
 24Rawsoni to Granville, 17 April 1870, C.O. 28/21 1.
 25Parlia,nentary Debates (Lords), 3rd ser., vol. 193 (7 July 1868): 784-85.
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 volatility of sectarian animosities when combined with racial and class an-
 tagonisms that were the rule in all of the sugar colonies.26 Derby and Disraeli's
 short-lived Tory government in 1868 had acted to end imperial funding, thereby
 throwing the West Indian Church totally onto local revenues for support.27
 In 1869 the Liberals decided to go a step further and disestablish the unpopular
 colonial church. A struggle over the form and extent of disestablishment fol-
 lowed. That struggle reveals a deep Liberal distrust of blanket laissez-faire ap-
 proaches in religion. In sanctioning disestablishment, the Liberals at the same
 time pushed hard to maintain post-disestablishment state aid for colonial
 religion. The minimalist state so cherished in liberal ideology could not safely
 be relieved of all of its religious role. To both conciliate religious dissenters
 and maintain religious spending in financially destitute colonies required finesse.
 Whitehall proposed to do so through a new scheme called concurrent endow-
 ments-distributing state aid equally to all religious groups proportionate to
 their numbers.28
 Almost immediately, Baptists, Presbyterians, and Wesleyans in Jamaica chal-
 lenged this approach and demanded total disendowment as well as disestablish-
 ment. Jamaican dissenters objected that state aid in any form was anti-scriptural
 and obnoxious. Any system, equally fuinded or not, they argued, would in effect
 force persons to pay for propagation of religious opinions with which they dis-
 agreed.29 At the Colonial Office Lord Granville himself was somewhat sensitive
 to this view. The Colonial Secretary wondered how to deal with "those not very
 respectable coloured ministers who having separated from the parent sect, set
 up for themselves and obtain large congregations." However objectionable, their
 numbers would create a claim under the proposed concurrent endowment
 scheme.30
 On more practical grounds, the Baptists tried to argue that voluntary action
 and voluntary financial support-religious laissez-faire if you please-would
 26"Memorial of the Jamaica Baptist Unioni on the Clergy Law," 1868, C.O. 137/440; Grant to
 Granville, 23 July 1869, C.O. 137/442; Chambers to Kimberley, 12 October 1872, Parliamentary
 Papers, -1873, vol. 48 (259), pp. 781-83; Morris to Myers, 1 January 1866, Parlianmentary Papers,
 1866, vol. 30 [C. 3682], p. 86; and Lawson to Myers, 11 January 1866, ibid., p. 43.
 27Schneider, "The Aniglican Church in the British Empire," p. 700; and "West Inidian Coloniies etc.
 (Ecclesiastical Funds)," Parliamenitary Papers, 1870, vol. 50 (194), p. 811.
 28Granville to Grant, 16 November 1869, C.O. 137/442; Kimberley to Rawson, 13 September and
 27 December 1871, Parliamtientary Papers, 1873, vol. 48 (259), pp. 721-30 and 747; and Kimberley
 to Pine, 26 January 1872, ibid., p. 777.
 29".Memorial of the Jamaica Baptist Unioni oni the Clergy Law," 1868, C.O. 137/440; "Extract from
 the Minutes of the Northern Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church of Jamaica," 4 May 1869, C.O.
 137/441; and "Memorial of the Missionaries and Ministers of the Gospel in the Parish of St. James"
 to Granville, June 1869, C.O. 137/441; and The Timles (Londoni), 29 June and 12 August 1868.
 30Miniute by Granville oni Gratnt to Granville, 23 July 1869, C.O. 137/442.
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 better meet the spiritual needs of Jamaica than any system of state aid. Even
 Governor Pine of the Leewards believed that self-reliance made the unendowed
 churches in his territory more vigorous and their clergy less prone to scandal
 than the established church.3'
 However, few officials shared Pine's view. London authorities concluded that
 the kind of voluntary support the dissenters advocated and practiced had already
 proved a failure in Jamaica, Trinidad, and the Windward Islands. Neither the
 Baptists nor the more numerous Wesleyans of Jamaica had shown any real
 growth over the previous twenty-five years. Many Baptist ministers had to sup-
 plement their salaries with shop-keeping. Many Baptist pulpits were unoccupied
 and their "congregations lamentably disproportional to the accommodations for
 them."32 The largely peasant dissenting population seemed unable or unwilling
 to maintain existing churches and ministers voluntarily-let alone provide for
 the 200,000 to 250,000 Jamaicans beyond the reach of any religious instruction.
 From London's perspective it was "a duty (social and religious) to reclaim these
 people...." Governor Grant and the Colonial Office staff in London predicted
 that without state aid to religion there loomed a "lapse toward a state of heathen
 barbarism" with Haitian-style social evils in its wake. To the Colonial Office
 the stakes seemed high. Given the Baptists' failure to expand their base without
 state aid, London could not understand how the Baptists could object to equal
 state funding for missionary endeavors of all churches.33
 Object they did, however. The Baptist-led anti-endowment petition campaign
 in Jamaica was so vigorous that the Liberal Colonial Secretary modified the
 religious aid proposal. Late in 1869 London directed the Jamaican Governor to
 end religious spending altogether in that colony and use the money for education
 if he could not gain general consent for equal aid to all religious groups. In
 December of 1869, Jamaica's 40,000 Baptists refused the proposed aid. This
 forced a most reluctant total disendowment of all religion in the colony?4
 In the other West Indian colonies and in Mauritius, dissenting groups usually
 accepted the concurrent endowment principle. Where accepted, state aid was
 allocated according to the numerical strength of the various denominations. Still,
 the Liberals in London continued to look for ways to encourage religious out-
 reach to the unchurched in the sugar colonies. Lord Kimberley, for example,
 31Pine to Kimberley, 5 March, 1872, C.O. 884/2.
 32Granit to Granville, 23 July 1869, C.O. 137/442; Minutes by Granville, Rogers, Taylor, and Elliot
 on Grant to Granville, 23 July 1869, C.O. 137/442; Rawson to Granville, 17 April 1870, C.O.
 28/211; and Message by Governor Longden to the Trinidad Legislative Council, 1 June 1871,
 enclosed in Longden to Kimberley, 22 July 1871, C.O. 884/2.
 33Minutes by Taylor and Rogers oln Grant to Granville, 26 August 1869, C.O. 137/443.
 34Granville to Grant, 16 November 1869, C.O. 137/442; and The Times (London), 13 January and
 27 September 1870.
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 wanted state funding formulas to consider the evangelizing vigor and voluntary
 efforts of particular religious groups as a balance to the purely census-based
 division of funds introduced in 1869.35 For British Liberals, disestablishment in
 no way implied a wish to sever ties between religion and the state. Disestablish-
 ment served to defuse troublesome religious, racial, and class tensions. Still the
 value of religion as a tool of social order dictated its continued funding at
 pre-disestablishment levels. As Parliamentary Under Secretary Edward
 Knatchbull-Hugessen stated to the House of Commons, in the Liberal cabinet's
 view the lessening of religious influence in these colonies "would entail a larger
 expenditure for magistrates and police."36 If religious spending could not be
 continued in Jamaica, education spending was to be its substitute.
 British officialdom also saw education, like religion, as a gentle supplement
 to courts and police in ordering the lives of the poor.37 However, left to them-
 selves, the pre-1865 sugar colony planter-oligarchies had done little for public
 instruction. In 1864, for example, the unreformed Jamaican government spent
 a mere ?2,137 on education for a population of half a million. As late as 1870
 Bermuda spent only ?500 per year on schools.38 In Trinidad, with an 1868
 population of 85,000, only 2,836 children attended thirty-five schools whose
 demoralized teachers worked in dilapidated and unsanitary buildings. Able to
 send their own children abroad for education, the white colonial elites feared
 that too much learning spoiled children for field work, or turned good hands to
 preaching or agitation.3 Their neglect of education for the poor, according to
 an 1869 investigation, was enough to "bring discredit upon any country that
 recognizes civilization as a principle of government."40 The Liberals acted on
 this indictment.
 At home, the Forster Education Act signified the Gladstone cabinet's accep-
 tance of the social, political, and moral need for expanding the limits of the
 liberal minimalist state in this new direction. In the sugar colonies, the conver-
 sion to Crown Colony government after 1865, meant that there, too, London
 35Kimberley to Longden, 11 Januiary 1872, C.O. 884/2.
 36Parlianmentary Debates (Commons), 3rd ser., vol. 206 (9 June 1871): 1817-20.
 37Victorian views on the relation of education and social control at home are explored in Richard
 Johnson, "Educational Policy and Social Control," pp. 96-119; and idem, "Educating the Educators,"
 pp. 77-107.
 38Parry and Sherlock, A Short History of the West Indies, p. 248; Henry C. Wilkinson, Bermuda
 from Sail to Steam: The History of the Islandform 1784 to 1901, 2 vols. (London Press, 1973),
 2: 754; and J. K. Chapman, The Career of Arthur Hamilton Gordon: First Lord Stannmore, 1829-
 1912 (Toronto, 1964), p. 64.
 39Mclean to Eyre, January 1866, Parliamentary Papers, 1866, vol., 30 [C. 3682], p. 76.
 40'Report on the State of Education in Trinlidad," Parliamentary Papers, 1870, vol. 50 (450), p.
 666.
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 could force new attention and new government funding for education. Jamaica's
 spending on public schools increased by sixty percent in the period 1867-69
 and was sufficient to bring 33,343 of the colony's 148,000 school-aged children
 into government-inspected schools. Over the period 1864 to 1880, Jamaica's
 education spending soared from a mere ?2,137 per year to ?25,715. Enrollment
 in Trinidad's schools climbed from 2,836 in 1868 to 19,855 in 1890. In addition,
 Jamaica, Trinidad, British Guiana, the Windward Islands, and Mauritius under-
 took major education reform or reorganization programs.4' These colonial educa-
 tion initiatives represented a renewed emphasis on "civilization as a principle
 of government," which paralleled the Liberals' education reforms at home.
 The civilizing process to be realized via education was seen to work in many
 directions. Education could be used to create a colonial collaborating class. In
 India, from the 1830s the British attempted to create an educated, native middle
 class to act as intermediaries between the rulers and the masses. Further, some
 believed that mass literacy in India, by acquiainting people with the supposedly
 just laws of England, would foster loyalty to the imperial government.42 Beyond
 loyalty, there was morality and order. The Anti-Slavery Society commended
 the new sugar colony edtucation efforts as a way to lift these colonies from their
 "low moral and social condition." Governor Pine of the Leeward Islands linked
 the ignorance of the laboring masses to their susceptibility to excitation and to
 being misled to riots and disturbances.43
 Moreover, the ripple effects of education were thought to extend beyond the
 child in the classroom to parents and the adult community at large. Thus Patrick
 Keenan, the Dublin expert who investigated Trinidad education in 1869 for the
 Colonial Office, lamented the island's lack of any schools for its thousands of
 Indian children because it meant they and their families were "uninfluenced by
 any huimanizing agency except...the law." For Trinidad, Keenan envisioned that
 through the education of Indian laborers' children "there might come into play
 upon the parents, a series of reflective influences inculcating a respect for truth
 41Grant to Granville, 8 February 1869, C.O. 137/440; Colonial Office Minutes on "Jamaica Report
 on Schools, 1871," C.O. 137/465. Gordon to Granville, 24 November 1869, Parliamentary Papers,
 1870, vol. 50 (450), p. 761; Elliot Minute oni Gordon to Granville, 8 September 1869, C.O. Files,
 Trinidad, C.O. 295/248; W. L. Bum, The British West Indies (Westport, Coin., 1951), p. 44; Parry
 and Sherlock, A Short History of the West Indies, p. 249; and Chapman, The Career of Arthur
 Hamilton Gordon, pp. 64, 136.
 42Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India (Oxford, 1959), p. 252.
 43Pine to Kimberley, 26 January 1871, Parliamentary Papers, 1871, vol. 48 [C. 353], p. 683; and
 Statement by Deputation of the Anti-Slavery Society to Governor J. P. Grant, 8 June 1870,
 Minutebook, Anti-Slavery Society Papers, Rhodes House, Oxford, Mss. Br. Emp. S20/E2/9.
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 and other virtues" believed missing from coolie character. Schools, acting
 through the children, would improve family tone and social discipline."
 Approaches to educational reform reflected each colony's unique character.
 Beyond increased budget support for existing schools, Governor Grant of
 Jamaica in 1870 fuinded a training school for teachers and inaugurated a system
 of opening grants for new schools in areas where none previously existed.
 Moreover, Grant led Jamaican education to emphasize vocational and technical
 training, forms considered "safe" for blacks.45
 Governor Arthur Hamilton Gordon brought education reform to both Trinidad
 and Mauritius in the late 1860s and early 1870s. Both communities were former
 French possessions conquered in the Napoleonic wars. Unsuccessful Angliciza-
 tion efforts directed through the secular schools had alienated the predominantly
 French Catholic white elites from the government and, by the late 1860s, fueled
 increasing religious and ethnic strife. French Catholics had deserted the hated
 public primary and secondary schools out of bitter objection both to their English
 language-based primary instruction and to their lack of religious training.
 French-settler creation of a Catholic, French-language school system in com-
 petition with the existing public schools alarmed British officials. Governor Gor-
 don feared that education segregated along ethnic and religious lines would
 perpetuate or even exacerbate already serious social tensions in Trinidad and
 Mauritius." Thus, a central feature of education reform was the creation of
 suitable collaborating classes through the integration of French and English, and
 Protestant and Catholic communities.
 In 1869, Patrick Keenan toured Trinidad's schools and made a number of
 recommendations to better manage the schools as well as to blunt Catholic
 criticism. Keenan proposed a system of local control for primary education that
 would bring the school facilities and faculties under the supervision of the clergy
 of the majority denomination in a given area. In addition, Keenan recommended
 that Catholic religious objections be met with a system of purely voluntary
 religious instruiction in the public schools. Keenan fuirther recommended a new
 primary school program for the island's Indian immigrant children. With full
 backing from the Colonial Office, Gordon carried into effect most of Keenan's
 recommendations.47
 44"Report on the State of Education in Trinidad," Parliamentary Papers, 1870, vol. 50 (450), p.
 666.
 45Grant to Granville, 8 February 1869, C.O. 137/440; Colonial Office Minutes on "Jamaica Report
 on Schools, 1871," C.O. 137/465; Governor Grant's Response to Deputation From the Anti-Slavery
 Society, 8 June 1870, Anti-Slavery Society Papers, Minutebook, Mss. Br. Emp. S20/E2/9.
 46Bridget Brereton, Race Relations in Colonial Trinidad, 1870-1900 (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 72-73.
 4"Report on the State of Education in Trinidad," Parliamentary Papers, 1870, vol. 50 (450), pp.
 665-704.
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 These reforms concerned primary education; secondary education reform re-
 quired additional ingenuity. In Trinidad and Mauritius, Gordon brought the ex-
 isting secular state-supported secondary schools into a collegiate association
 with their more popular Catholic rivals. Through shared faculty and attendance
 at common lectures and exams, Gordon hoped to produce an amalgamation of
 the upper classes that would gradually overcome the religious, national, and
 racial animosities threatening the stability of these communities.48
 The push for educational reform in the sugar colonies represented a concerted
 Liberal effort to establish a firmer basis for social peace and continued British
 control of these economically bankrupt and racially troubled colonies. Belief in
 the transforming effects of education even had an impact on colonial road build-
 ing and land reform, which in part aimed to provide easier lower class access
 to schools and churches as well as labor markets-all of which were presumed
 to civilize.49
 While education served an imperial purpose, it also held the potential of
 developing the local talents needed to give colonial subjects some control over
 their own social, economic, and even political destinies. Without these Crown-
 dictated investments the slide toward social disintegration would have been more
 rapid, and the available human resources for recovery and renewal would have
 been far fewer. Crown-dictated education investments were certainly wise.
 Moreover, because they held promise for great benefit to colonial peoples, these
 education reforms were morally commendable by every standard both then and
 now.
 However, a fuller moral and political assessment of the overall wisdom of
 sugar-colony government activism requires that these dramatic changes in
 education spending be placed in a wider context. In Jamaica, of a total 1873
 budget of ?500,000, the government spent only ?20,000, or four percent, on
 education. It spent three to four times that amount annually on the importation
 of coolie labor.50 Aid to the sugar industry through subsidized indentured labor
 schemes took funding precedence over mass education in colonial budgets.
 The importation of indentured coolie labor was arguably the most nefarious
 aspect of British policy in the sugar colonies.5' Contemporary humanitarian
 48Gordon to Granville, 8 September 1869, and Granville to Gordon, 12 November 1869, C.O.
 295/248; Gordon to Granville, 24 November 1869, Parliamentary Papers, vol. 50 (450), pp. 761-68;
 and Gertrude Carmichael, The History of the West Indian Islands of Trinidad and Tobago (London,
 1961), p. 265.
 49Donald Wood, Trinidad in Transition: The Years After Slavery (Londoln, 1968), pp. 268-69.
 50 The Times (Londoni), 16 February 1874; and Clarke to Grant, 28 April 1873, Anti-Slavery Society
 Papers, Mss. Br. Emp. S22/G65.
 51Hugh Tinker, A New System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labour Overseas 1830-1920 (Ox-
 ford, 1974), pp. xiv-xv. Tinker exhaustively studies a system of pervasive abuse of indentured
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 groups viewed post-emancipation indentured labor systems as morally suspect
 at best and at worst, little different from slavery. Because freed blacks preferred
 self-employment to plantation wage labor, the end of slavery in the 1 830s jeop-
 ardized plantation sugar production. Rather than allow free labor in a free market
 to dictate the economic evolution of the sugar colonies, successive British
 governments sanctioned government-subsidized indentured labor systems. At
 home, the sugar lobby remained powerful. To Whitehall the survival of plan-
 tation sugar produiction still seemed the best hope for the colonial financial
 solvency that would save British taxpayers from unpleasant colonial burdens.
 Gladstone Liberals accepted this logic without controversy. Furthermore, regres-
 sive colonial tax systems forced the black free laborer to subsidize his own
 labor competition and to bear a disproportionate share of the cost of educating
 his own children. Moreover, there were alternatives to plantation agriculture.
 Thomas C. Holt's recent study of Jamaica challenges strongly the assumed
 economic necessity of propping up the plantation system and demonstrates the
 emergence of an overlooked but vigorous small-producer sector in the
 nineteenth-century Jamaican economy.52 Saving the plantation with imported
 coolie labor served an imperial purpose, not a local one. With imperial policy
 focused so sharply on the needs of the declining plantation sector, resources
 were diverted from projects of greater potential benefit to colonial peoples, and
 widespread illiteracy remained a problem in all of the suigar colonies for some
 time to come.
 The post-emancipation resort to indentured coolie labor to replace the slaves
 on colonial sugar plantations fuirther disturbed already troubled societies and
 created serious new challenges for colonial justice systems as well as for educa-
 tion. The Liberals had to take seriously the challenge of providing justice in
 colonial settings. Resentment of prejudiced local justice lay behind Jamaica's
 1865 Morant Bay insurrection, which had actually begun at a session of the
 local court53 and had led to the killing of thirty whites including the local
 magistrate.54 Deficient and corrupt justice threatened control and could be costly.
 plantation workers, which remained "a blot on1 the British Empire" until it ended in the aftermath
 of World War I.
 52Thomas C. Holt, The Problem of Freedoin: Race, Labor, and Politics in Janmaica and Britain
 1832-1938 (Baltimore and Londoni, 1992), pp. 142-49 and 270-71.
 53Eyre to Cardwell, January 1866, Parliamientary Papers, 1866, vol. 30 [C. 3682], pp. 12-18.
 54The disturbances at Morant Bay in 1865 are treated in the following: Frank Cundall, Political
 and Social Disturbances in the West Indies: A Brief Account and Bibliography (Londoll, 1906);
 Hume Wrong, Government of the West Indies (Oxford, 1923), p. 74; W. L. Burn, The British West
 Indies (Westport, Connecticut, 1951), 140-42; Arvel Erickson, "Empire or Anarchy: The Jamaica
 Rebellion of 1865," Thte Journal of Negro History 44 (April 1959): 99-122; Sir Alan Bunis, History
 of the British West Indies (London, 1965), pp. 672-73; Bernard Semmel, Democracy Versus Emtpire:
 The Jamaica Riots of 1865 and the Governor Eyre Controversy (New York, 1969), pp. 11-23.
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 At its best, justice could channel discord, promote peace, and save lives and
 money. All of this was accepted as an intellectual proposition. However, it was
 fear of revolt that prompted much that the Liberals did to reform colonial justice.
 A series of small-scale 1869 coolie revolts on plantations in British Guiana
 and protests on behalf of abused indentured labor in Mauritius prompted Liberal
 action on the justice issue and set in motion a major expansion of colonial
 government to provide health care to indentured laborers. The Guiana distur-
 bances revealed the ill-health and abuse of indentured plantation laborers and
 their powerlessness when facing corrupt local judges. Following the riots,
 George William Des Voeux, the administrator of St. Lucia and a former British
 Guiana magistrate, wrote a scathing public indictment of the entire system of
 justice in British Guiana, which added force to the furor. Similar protests in
 Mauritius led Governor Arthur Hamilton Gordon to call for investigation there.
 According to Des Voeux the largest number of cases he heard involved breach
 of contract accuisations against indentured coolie laborers whose "half starved
 appearance" caused him grave concern. Food and medical services were, Des
 Voeux charged, woefully lacking on many plantations, and many of the coolies
 he jailed for breach of contract were idle due to sickness and premature dis-
 missals from plantation infirmaries. Planter-paid estate physicians were prone
 to look to the planter's interest in getting maximum work days from each in-
 dentured laborer rather than to the laborer's health. Half a world away in
 Mauritius, protests charged that planters exploited irregular wage payments so
 as to coerce unwilling reindentures. Similar misuse was alleged in other plan-
 tation colonies. The result was high desertion rates, high death rates, and coolie
 unrest and disturbances.: These abuses made the indenture system "in some
 respects not far removed from slavery" as Des Voeux saw it.56
 Both Gordon and Des Voeuix leveled their most forceftul indictments at the
 local stipendiary magistrates who passed judgment in vagrancy and breach of
 contract cases. Gordon found the judicial system in Mauritius biased and hope-
 lessly intertwined with the planting interest. In British Guiana, as Des Voeux
 saw it, the magistrates tended to be men of humble origins who had acquired
 an unhealthy awe of the powerful planting classes, whose influence couild make
 life either miserable or easy for a magistrate. In some instances, estate managers
 or planters themselves served as magistrates. Thuis, black and Indian coolie
 laborers stood little chance in court against powerful employers and stringent
 55Gordoii to Kimberley, 1 June 1871, 8 August 1871, 2 September 1871, and 17 October 1871,
 C.O. 882/2; Gordon to Gladstone, 3 May 1871, and Gordon to Kimberley, 31 May 1871, in
 Gladstone Gordon Correspontdence, 1851-1896: Selectionis Fromti the Private Correspondence of a
 British Prime Miniister and A Colonial Governor, ed. Knaplund, vol. 51, pt. 4, pp. 56-58.
 56Des Voeux to Granville, 25 December 1869, Parliamlentary Papers, 1871, vol. 20 [C. 393], pp.
 487-500.
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 employer-inspired labor codes.57 Des Voeux recommended creation of a new
 independent court system to deal with labor cases and an independent govern-
 ment-paid medical service. Improved justice, Des Voeux argued, could help
 avert a blood bath.58
 Despite opposition from the West India lobby at home,59 the Liberal Govern-
 ment sent Royal Investigatory Commissions to both Guiana and Mauritius. They
 reasoned quite simply that local justice had once again failed, and stability was
 threatened. Lord Kimberley, the Liberal Colonial Secretary, warned that while
 investigations themselves ran the risk of exciting the "overexcitable" black and
 brown laboring classes, it was "even more dangerous to allow them [the
 laborers]...any grounds for supposing that complaints respecting their condition
 or the administration of justice are left unnoticed by Her Majesty's Govern-
 ment." Moreover, the Colonial Office was concerned that the planters might
 use a failure to investigate these allegations as proof that there was no ground
 for dissatisfaction with existing arrangements. Finally, and if for no other reason,
 these reports had to be taken seriously because the government of India
 threatened to end coolie emigration to colonies suspected of ill treatment.60 Lon-
 don was certain that "many evils and abuses would be found."6'
 While commissioners gathered evidence in Guiana and Mauritius, immigration
 officers in each sugar colony gained fill authority to remove indentured labor
 from plantations not meeting minimuim standards for working conditions, food,
 housing, and medical care.62 With London's support, colonial Governors went
 much further with reforms totuching laborers. In Jamaica Governor John Peter
 Grant created a new system of district courts under Crown control with special
 powers over labor cases. Jamaica also abolished imprisonment for debt and
 reformed local government to reduice corruption. In the Leeward Islands in 1869,
 Govemor Benjamin Pine implemented a Federation Scheme that promised im-
 proved justice through a federal "circuit court of highly qualified judges" em-
 powered to grant changes of venue when local prejudice or planter power
 57Des Voeux to Granville, 25 December 1869, Parliamnentary Papers, 1871 vol. 20 [C. 393], pp.
 487-500; and George William Des Voeux, My Colonial Service in British Guiana, St. Lucia,
 Trinidad, Fiji, Auistralia, New Foundland, and Hong Kong, 2 vols. (London, 1903), 1: 119-121.
 58Ibid.
 59West India Committee to Graniville, 24 May 1870, C.O. 318/258.
 60Colonial Office to Governors Gordon, Pine, Rushworth, Scott, Rawson, and Granit, 27 May 1870,
 C.O. 318/259; and India Office to Colonial Office, 28 October 1872, C.O. 882/2.
 61Rogers to MacGregor, 31 May 1870, C.O. 318/258; and Kimberley to Gordon, 19 January 1872,
 Kimberley Papers, G-130.
 62Murdock to Rogers, 26 January and 16 February 1870, C.O. 318/259.
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 threatened justice.63 Similar reforms were undertaken in Mauritius and the other
 sugar colonies in the 1870s. Local magnates resisted in some places, leaving
 laborers the impression that the planters would block their access to improved
 justice in order to "ride them down by the hand of oppression." However, the
 push for reform soon produced evidence enough that the lower classes now
 looked upon Crown officials "as more friendly to them than the planting body."64
 This, after all, was the practical objective of the policy of "justice to the darker
 races.
 One of the most interesting and surprising expansions of state activity that
 came in the wake of these investigations was the creation of government health
 services in the coolie importing colonies. Governor Grant of Jamaica created
 the model followed in many colonies. Grant placed plantation medical officers
 on government payroll. This removed the profit motive and brought respon-
 sibility for coolie health directly into the government's hands. The reformed
 Jamaican system also required partial payment of plantation wages in the form
 of daily food rations.6' Government intervention like this was unprecedented at
 home.
 Even though the Liberals souight to build colonial social peace through fairer
 systems of justice, they were still quite sure that police and armed forces were
 also required. British experience in India and Ireland reinforced these con-
 clusions. In the non-white Empire, Arthur Mills was sure that "when our scepter
 can no longer be supported by our sword, the days of our dominion.. .will be
 numbered." James Fitzjames Stephen, a member of the Indian Viceroy's Council
 from 1869-72, compared the British position in India to a bridge over which
 natives passed from brute violence to peace and industry. One pier supporting
 that bridge was justice; the other was military power.6
 Informed by personal experience in Ireland, Lord Kimberley at the Colonial
 Office preached repression of crime as "a duty which must be discharged at
 any cost," even if it risked "violating the constitutional liberties" of subject
 63Graiiville to Pine, 21 June 1869 and 16 May 1870, and Pine to Granville, 11 December 1869,
 Parliamentary Papers, 1871, vol. 48 [C. 353], pp. 629, 634, and 666; and Parliamentary Debates
 (Lords), 3rd ser. vol. 106 (19 May 1871): 1024.
 64Pinie to Granville, 23 March 1870, Petition to Kimberley 24 August 1870, and Pine to Kimberley,
 12 December 1870, Parliatmientary Papers, 1871, vol. 48 [C. 353] pp. 654-60, 664, and 673-74.
 65Grant to Granville, 19 December 1869, Parliamiientary Papers, 1871, vol. 48 [C.334], pp. 7-8;
 "Thirtieth General Report of the Emigration Commission, 1870," ibid., 1870. vol. 17 [C. 196],
 139-46; and "Thirty-First General Report of the Emigration Commission, 1871," ibid., 1871, vol.
 20 [C. 369], 355-59.
 66Mills, "Our Colonial Policy," 217; The Timnes (Londoni), 4 January 1878, quoted in D. A. Low,
 Lion Rampant: Essays in the Stuidy of British Imtperialismn (London, 1973), p.55.
This content downloaded from 131.95.218.41 on Wed, 14 Jun 2017 15:04:41 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Emlpire and Social Reforml 271
 peoples, as did the Liberals' suspension of habeas corpus in Ireland at this time.
 "We want Thor's hammer for the purpose,"67 wrote Kimberley. He urged that
 natives be made to understand that Britain "was strong enough to avenge any
 atrocity committed on its subjects." For Kimberley, just laws could have no
 healing effect "unless outrages and disturbances were stopped by stem law en-
 forcement."6 Progress and police work went hand-in-hand.
 Colonial Governors in the sugar colonies echoed these views. Grant in Jamaica
 believed that restored law and order would "make economic vigor in the future
 sure." In the Leewards, Governor Benjamin Pine was certain that "strong
 government.. .fair and prompt administration of justice, and.. .full and complete
 protection of the lives and properties of subjects" was "so necessary, so ab-
 solutely essential, to give confidence to capital enterprise."69
 High costs and predictable political controversies meant that actual resort to
 blood letting held few attractions. Nonetheless, the 1869 Reil Rebellion in
 Manitoba and the Ashantee War in 1873-74 prove the Liberals' willingness to
 use force when challenged in colonial settings. Kimberley particularly seemed
 ready to do so. When apprised of election riots in Quebec in 1872, Kimberley
 could not understand "for the life of me...why the authorities did not order the
 Police, and if necessary the Soldiers to fire at the mob point blank" when the
 first shot rang from the crowd. When it came to firearms Kimberley wanted
 "to teach a mob at once that disciplined men can use them best."70 If authority
 was challenged, effective demonstrations of power were required to recover lost
 prestige. A swift-rather than delayed-show of force was thought most humane
 and less costly in lives and money. Delay in punishment would only embolden
 challengers. This was especially true for peoples whom Liberals like Kimberley
 stigmatized as racially excitable, impulsive, and peculiarly susceptible to mob
 psychology and panic.7' Even John Bright, a moralistic Quaker and the most
 67Thor's hammer was the lightling rod, a symbol of justice, see Kimberley Diary, 9 February
 1871, Kimberley Papers, A-3. Kimberley's personal diary now available in his private papers at
 the Bodleian containis many comments not published in the Journal below which he apparently
 intended for publication.
 68John, first Earl of Kimberley, A Jouirnal of Events During the Gladstone Miniistry 1868-1874,
 ed. Ethel Drus, The Camden Miscellany, vol. 21 (Londoni, 1958), 14 December 1869, and 2 March
 1870, pp. 10 and 12; and Parliainientary Debates (Lords) 3rd ser., vol. 200 (20 March 1870):
 817-21, vol. 206 (2 May 1871): 1-14, and vol. 214 (June 1873): 628-29.
 69The Times (Londoni), 28 October 1868; and Pine to the Legislative Assembly of Nevis, 1 December
 1870, Parliamentary Papers, 1871, vol. 48 [C. 353], pp. 678-79.
 70Kimberley to Dufferini, 28 AugLust 1872, Kimberley Papers, G-1 19.
 71Kimberley to Gladstone, 18 August 1873, and 27 May 1874, Gladstone Papers, Add. Mss. 44225,
 80 and 150-53; Kimberley to Goschen, 12 September 1873, and Cardwell to Goschen, 12 September
 1873, quoted in Arthur D. Elliot, The Life of George Joachim Goscheni 1831-1902, 2 vols. (Londoni,
 1911), 2: 122-24; and The Times (London) 25 September 1873.
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 squeamish Liberal in Gladstone's cabinet, held that demonstrations of force
 among such people might be mercy to them.72
 Short of its actual use, the mere presence of armed force was thought to exert
 a beneficial "moral influence" with colored races, who were believed especially
 impressed with the "signs and symbols of authority." Kimberley argued that
 adequate displays of force to subject peoples would prevent disorders from oc-
 curring in the first place.73 Therefore, the West Indies and Mauritius were
 granted exemption from the Liberals' imperial military reorganization program
 of the 1870s, which aimed to concentrate British power in Europe through
 removing troops from outlying areas. Despite the recognition that except for
 Bermuda there was "no strictly imperial ground for stationing troops in any part
 of the West Indies," seven white regiments, two black regiments, and two ar-
 tillery batteries were left there. Hereafter, these troops were deployed in the
 islands in patterns designed primarily for response to domestic disturbances.74
 Similar concerns about internal control left 1,100 imperial troops on station in
 Mauritiuis, although the colonists had to pay nearly half their cost.75
 Imperial troops constituted "signs and symbols" of British control, but local
 police forces made that authority effective in the day-to-day lives of colonists.
 The 1869 Guiana coolie disturbances led to the immediate diversion of $40,000
 from the colony's immigration fund toward the expense of a new police force.76
 Colonial police reform was a high priority from 1868-74. Its emphasis was
 improved discipline and control. Once again, Jamaica led the way. Here in 1869
 Governor Grant centralized police administration and constituted a new rural
 police force under direct Crown control.77 A year later on Nevis in the Leeward
 Islands, planter resistance to Governor Pine's push for federation proved the
 unreformed local police forces unreliable in face of planter terror and coercion.
 From the perspective of social peace, the Leewards' federation plan held the
 72James L. Sturgis, Johni Brig/t anld the Empire (London, 1969), p. 40.
 73Wodehouse to Ripon, 17 January 1866, Ripon Papers, British Library, London, Add. Mss. 43522/ff.
 93-95; See also opinlionI to this effect in J. Spedding, "The Future of the British Empire,"
 Westminster Review 38 (July 1870): 58-60; and The Times (Londoni), 4 November and 13 November
 1865.
 74Grant to Major General O'Connor, 17 August 1869, C.O. 137/443; Lowe to Cardwell, 9 November
 1870, Cardwell Papers, The Public Record Office, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, P.R.O. 30/48/22;
 Colonial Office to War Office, 19 April 1873, C.O. 318/272; and Kimberley Minute 25 May 1873,
 C.O. 318/272.
 75Barkly to Buckingham, 16 November 1868, Barkly to Granville, 29 April 1869, and Storks to
 Sanford, 12 June 1869, C.O. 882/2.
 76Emigration Board to Governor Scott, 10 March 1870, and Murdock to Rogers, 24 August 1870,
 C.O. 318/259.
 77Hurwitz and Hurwitz, Jamaica: A Historical Portrait, pp. 180-81; and Gardner, A History of
 Jamaica, pp. 495-505.
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 advantage of creating a more efficient federal police force under Crown com-
 mand, which could be concentrated quickly at any danger point. This was "a
 78 matter of no small moment" to the Liberal Colonial Secretary. The Liberals
 also constituted new or reformed police forces in the Bahamas, Ceylon, and
 Hong Kong.79
 Among their duties, reformed, centrally-controlled police forces reached into
 the lives of the poor to enforce severe colonial vagrancy laws. In Guiana, coolie
 contract laborers caught without a pass more than two miles from their estate
 were subject to arrest without warrant. In Trinidad, arrest without warrant
 threatened any indentured worker "found in or upon any public highway or
 street, or on any land or house, not being the land or house of his employer"
 without his employer's signed permission.80
 In Mauritius the law required even free, non-indentured Indians to carry a
 police pass with identifying photograph. Loss of the police pass incurred fines
 equal to two months' average wages. Failure to obtain a pass made Indians
 automatically vagrant and subject to imprisonment at hard labor for twenty-eight
 days on the first conviction and nine months on suibsequent convictions. Still
 further, the right to work as a free laborer in Mauritius required purchase of an
 annual license-the cost of which was ?1, or almost two months' pay. Heavy
 fines, arrest as a vagrant, or confinement until an employer could be found
 awaited those caught working without licenses. Moreover, the Mauritian law
 demanded police notification of changes of employer or any travel olutside one's
 district of residence.8'
 The Mauritian laws are notable because they applied to all of the Indian
 population whether free or indentured. By 1870 Indians made up sixty-eight
 percent of that island's population.82 Elsewhere, vagrancy statutes more often
 singled out indentured coolies alone. Despite the fact that Indian government
 officials labeled vagrancy laws in Trinidad, Mauritius, and British Guiana "harsh
 and unjustifiable,"3 the Liberals in London let them stand unchanged.
 78Granville to Pine, 21 June 1869 and 16 May 1870, Parliamentary Papers, 1871, vol. 48 [C.353],
 pp. 629 and 666; Pine to Granville, 11 December 1869, ibid., 634; Pine to Kimberley, 12 December
 1870, ibid., 676-77; and Parliamzentary Debates (Lords), 3rd ser., vol. 106 (19 May 1871): 1024.
 79Gregory to Kimberley, 14 November 1873, Kimberley Papers, G-132; James Pope-Helnessy,
 Verandah, Some Episodes in the Crown Colonies, 1867-1889 (New York, 1964), pp. 184-85; and
 G. B. Endacott, A History of Hong Kong (Londonl, 1958), p. 161.
 80Scott to Kimberley, 21 December 1871, C.O. 884/2.
 81Gordon to Kimberley, 8 August 1871, C.O. 882/2.
 82Murdock to Colonial Office, 26 July 1872, C.O. 882/2; and P. J. Bamwell and A. Toussaint, A
 Short History of Mauritius (London, 1949), pp. 157-60.
 83Official Secretary to the Government of Bengal to Secretary to the Government of India, 7 May
 1872, C.O. 882/2.
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 Hard coercion also typified laws governing an indentured laborer's breach of
 contract. Most colonies treated a worker's breach of contract as a criminal of-
 fense with penalties ranging from prison sentences to fines, loss of wages,
 prolonged indenture, or all four. By contrast, when planters failed to keep faith
 with workers, the matter was treated as strictly a civil rather than a criminal
 case. Thus, the planter's liability was limited to payment of rightful back wages
 with no punitive threats at all comparable to the criminal fines or imprisonment
 imposed on laborers for like breaches of contract.84
 That Gladstone's government supported labor laws of such an intrusive, and
 illiberal nature illustrates the limitations of the English Liberals' concept of
 limited government. The private lives of dark-skinned laborers certainly con-
 stituted no sacred boundary beyond which government shouild not intrude. For
 the Liberals social necessity was ample justification for all sorts of government
 meddling. For the poor, freedom was safe only within narrow limits. Thus,
 Bishop Vincent Ryan of Mauritius urged stringent regulation of even non-in-
 dentured coolies as necessary "to develop anything like civilization and industry
 amongst them." He argued that high Indian crime rates justified the tough labor
 laws, and pointed to the parallels between the Mauritian coolies and "Her
 Majesty's subjects in England" who were "liable to be taken up by the police
 if they are not able to give account of themselves and their means of subsis-
 tence." Arthur Hamilton Gordon, a Liberal governor who earned high marks
 for reforms in Trinidad and Maturitius, found no fault with the stringency of the
 Mauritian vagrancy laws, but instead objected to the fact that they applied only
 to coolies and not to the creole and black populations of the island who were
 "neither less idle, vicious, or lawless, than the Indian."85 Similarly, when a local
 Chief Juistice ruled that breach of contract couild no longer be treated as a
 criminal offense in British Guiana, Emigration Commissioner T. W. C. Mturdock
 showed no rejoicing for the coolies. Instead Murdock fotund the laws "defensible
 as a matter of local necessity," and lamented the negative effect that employers'
 loss of these deterrents would have on the colony's prosperity.86
 London never challenged these views. Disciplined-even coerced-labor and
 leisure had their place in the civilizing mission that was part of the Liberals'
 approach to empire. The argument of "local necessity" satisfied the Colonial
 Office that, in the main, colonial vagrancy laws should be left alone. The only
 modifications the Colonial Office urged were for married women unlawfully
 84Gordon to Kimberley, 8 Auguist 1871, C.O. 882/2; and Scott to Kimberley, 21 December 1871,
 C.O. 884/2.
 85Ryan to Kimberley, 8 February 1872, C.O. 882/2; and Gordon to Kimberley, 14 November 1871
 and 9 February 1872, C.O. 882/2.
 86Murdock to Rogers, 18 January 1868, C.O. 318/252; Murdock to Colonial Office, 10 January
 1872, C.O. 882/2; and Kimberley to Gordon, 16 December 1871, C.O. 882/2.
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 absenting themselves from work due to pregnancy and child care, in which case
 imprisonment seemed inhlumane.87
 Moreover, women themselves were thought beneficial to promoting social
 order, becatuse they were believed to have a civilizing effect on male laborers.
 In the mid 1860s the Colonial Office forced labor recruiters to increase to at
 least forty percent the female-to-male ratio in shipments of immigrant coolie
 labor to the sugar colonies. Throughout the Gladstone era, the Colonial Office
 upheld this requirement despite pressure for its reduction from colonial agents,
 the Emigration Commission, and even the Government of India.88 The Colonial
 Office held that shortages of coolie women in the sugar colonies increased crime
 rates, including the "ferocity and frequency of murders." Moreover, "raising the
 social condition of the people" was more difficuilt where women were few.89
 Conversely, greater numbers of women would diminish crime and tend to
 produce "industrious, well-conducted and peaceable" laborers and "good sub-
 jects of India on their retirn to their native country." A secondary hope was
 that Indian men with families would be more likely to stay in the colonial labor
 force rather than go back to India at the end of their indenture. Greater numbers
 of women would thuls reduice immigration expenses and make production more
 profitable. Both of Gladstone's Colonial Secretaries successfuilly pressed to
 maintain "as high a proportion of females as possible" in the coolie immigration
 to British colonies."'
 Humanitarian grouips stuch as the Anti-Slavery Society condemned the entire
 indentuired labor system both for its abuse of coolies and for its ill effects on
 the freed black laboring classes of the sugar colonies. "The sole object and chief
 effect of coolie immigration," according to the Society, was to depress the wages
 of black native labor. Especially it objected to financing coolie immigration
 from general revenuies that were raised through regressive colonial tax structuires.
 By falling heavily on the poor, such taxes forced the black man to subsidize
 his own labor competition.9'
 87Circular Despatch to West Indiani Colonies, 8 Febniary 1870, C.O. 318/259.
 88Murdock to Elliot, 21 October 1868, C.O. 318/252; Rogers Minute on Murdock to Rogers, 31
 October 1868, C.O. 318/252; Colonial Office Circular to Coolie Importing Colonies, I February
 1869, C.O. 318/255; and Colonial Office to India Office, 2 October 1870, C.O. 318/259.
 89Secretary of State's Miniute oni Murdock to Rogers, 31 October 1868, C.O. 318/252; Sturge to
 Normandy, 17 April 1871, Anti-Slavery Society Papers, Mss. Br. Emp. S22/GIOlA; and Bishop
 Ryan to Kimberley, 8 February 1872, C.O. 882/2.
 90Coloniial Office to Emigratioii Commission, 2 December 1868, C.O. 318/252.
 91Statement by Deputationi of the Anti-Slavery Society to Governor J.P. Grant, 8 June 1870, and
 Minutes, 6 December 1872, Minutebook, Aniti Slavery Society Papers, Mss. Br. Emp. S20/E2/9;
 Clarke to Grant, 28 March and 28 April 1873, Anti-Slavery Society Papers, Mss. Br. Emp. S22/G65;
 and The Timiies (Londoni) 16 February 1874.
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 Colonial officials recognized that unfair tax structures could exacerbate social
 conflicts,92 but the Liberals also placed a premium on colonial governments'
 paying for themselves. The unreformed, pre-1865 West Indian assemblies had
 created the pattern of subsidized immigrant labor and regressive taxation. By
 forcing wages down and food prices up they aimed to drive free blacks to
 plantation work.93 Gladstone's cabinet did not reverse this pattern once the
 Crown gained effective power. The Colonial Office had no real objections to
 taxing the poor heavily, so long as the proceeds of the taxation were used to
 educate, civilize, and "promote their welfare in all ways possible."94 New
 government investment in schools, roads, sanitation, and medical services more
 obviously fit this rationale than did subsidized coolie immigration.
 Reform and spending priorities in the West Indies and Mauritius reveal much
 about real world limits to the Liberals' quest for the minimalist state so idealized
 in nineteenth-century laissez-faire theory. More importantly, this array of activist
 initiatives demonstrates the real strength of the Liberal commitment to the Em-
 pire. For strategic reasons London had determined to keep the sugar colonies
 going. Schools, churches, police, and courts-benevolent ends in themselves to
 humanitarians-would help save the home government from costly and embar-
 rassing colonial social turmoil. Similarly, no foreign threat dictated continued
 imperial troop deployments in the West Indies beyond Bermuda. Deterrence of
 local outbreaks was accepted as reason enough for the troops to stay on at
 London's expense.
 In practice, the Liberal social reforms created a more judicious mix of
 benevolent versus coercive tools to diminish the risk of fuiture upheavals. Crown
 Colony government made this shift in emphasis possible. Disestablishment of
 the Anglican Church removed a bitterly divisive issue from West Indian society,
 while concurrent endowment of all denominations enabled governments to con-
 tinue supporting religious outreach in hopes that the multiplication of faith
 would increase personal moral restraint and promote social peace. However,
 government religious policy was blind to the serious implications of subsidizing
 Christian sects while promoting the importation of large numbers of East Indian
 Hindu and Muslim laborers.
 In the schools the benefits of the new government activist reforms flowed
 equally to both sides in the imperial relationship. Using the new Crown ability
 92Pine to Granville, 23 March 1870, Parliamentary Papers, 1871, vol. 48 [C. 353], p. 664.
 93The Times (Londoni), 15 June 1868 and 18 July 1868; Gordon to Gladstone, 3 May 1871,
 Gladstonte-Gordon Correspondence, ed. Knapluind, p. 46. Gordon was "appalled" at Mauritius' taxa-
 tioIn, which fell "almost wholly oni the poor" while the rich were "pretty nearly exempted from
 taxation."
 94Taylor Minute, 14 July 1869, oni Cairns to Pine, 28 June 1869, C.O. Files, St. Christopher, C.O.
 239/121; and Taylor Miniute oni Grant to Granville, 23 July 1869, C.O. 137/442.
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 to overpower the planting interests, which suspected that education spoiled a
 man for field work, imperial education initiatives held the promise of promoting
 social order while multiplying marketable skills and opportunities for the
 colonial population. If fault is to be found with sugar colony education efforts,
 it is in the comparatively low proportion of available resources allocated to
 schools, rather than in the intention behind the investment that was made.
 Similarly, the trend toward government take-overs of health services for inden-
 tured laborers was of definite potential benefit to the laborer and removed one
 of the principle causes of criminal breach of contract prosecutions. While the
 indentured labor system itself was morally objectionable in the extreme, Crown
 efforts to increase the proportion of women in the flow of indentulred labor were
 well warranted both from the standpoint of the intrinsic needs of immigrant
 workers and from the perspective of promoting social peace. Moreover,
 reformed, centrally-controlled police forces and reformed couirts promised
 greater fairness in law enforcement and thus held the potential to deter violence
 and contribute to basic ptiblic order and security.
 However, local interests and humanitarian concerns were clearly subordinate.
 The preeminence of imperial rather than local interests is best demonstrated in-
 the retention and further development of the indentured coolie labor system.
 The maze of harsh personal restrictions and regulations to which coolie inden-
 tured workers continued to be subjected counter-balanced the positive effects
 of police and court reform and guaranteed periodic riots and disturbances. How-
 ever inhumane, Whitehall let the oppressive labor codes stand. Stubsidized im-
 migrant labor taxed the poor disproportionately and made a volatile ethnic and
 racial mix more so. Yet Liberal policy-makers accepted the necessity of inden-
 tured labor and never once seem to have questioned its wisdom. Government-
 financed indentuired labor propped tup the inefficient plantation economies,
 which London believed it must save if colonial governments were to come close
 to being self-financing. Saving the plantation offered policymakers hope for
 keeping these strategic assets with minimum expense to the taxpayers at home.
 In this, the black man and the Indian coolie were manipulated to serve world
 power objectives far beyond their range of understanding. No squeamish "little
 Englandism" is to be fouind in Liberal policy toward these colonies. Guided by
 an enduring vision of the strategic value of their bankrupt sugar colonies,
 Gladstone's first government undertook a host of activist reform programs aimed
 at consolidating the British hold. In all of this, the "civilizing mission" served
 the larger imperial puirpose.
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